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A NOTE ON FAIR TRADE
EDWARD S. HERMAN'-"
IN his provocative article "Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy,"'
Professor Walter Adams brings an impressive arsenal of scholarship to bear
on the legal status of the various alternatives to fair trade as instruments for
maintaining resale prices. Unfortunately, however, an uncritical treatment
of several basic issues seriously vitiates his argument and results in a set of
conclusions substantially irrelevant to considerations of public policy.
Professor Adams' conclusions are based on the propositions (1) that "the
case against fair trade rests on highly ambivalent evidence," and (2) that
resale price maintenance "can frequently be achieved without recourse to fair
trade.' 2 From these premises he infers (1) that "a repeal of the Miller-
Tydings and McGuire Acts is not an effective way of coping with the alleged
vice of resale price maintenance,"' 3 and (2) that since the fair trade laws have
"free and open competition" requirements for eligibility "it seems wiser-and
politically more realistic-to demand extension of the 'free and open competi-
tion' proviso to other forms of resale price maintenance rather than to urge
the repeal of the only laws of which it is now an explicit part.' 4 The purpose
of the present note is to evaluate the basic contentions that underlie Professor
Adams' conclusions, and to appraise the latter in the light of any adjustments
found necessary in the premises.
THE CASE AGAINST FAIR TRADE
The first premise that Professor Adams attempts to establish is that the
case against fair trade is inconclusive. He arrives at his result by the question-
able method of listing unweighted and incompletely evaluated arguments for
and against fair trade. He does not indicate which arguments he considers
important and correct, nor does he reconcile their obvious inconsistencies.
Presumably we are to conclude that the case is moot because arguments have
been mustered on each side.
Professor Adams presents four arguments against fair trade, neatly balanced
by four arguments in its defense. The first and "most telling argument against
fair trade is that in practical effect it nullifies the antitrust prohibitions against
tAssistant Professor of Economics, Pennsylvania State University.
1. 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955).
2. Id. at 969.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 990.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
horizontal price fixing." 5 Although economists are in virtually unanimous
agreement that this is a valid contention, and that the primary purpose and
effect of fair trade is to reduce price competition, 6 Professor Adams neglects
to inform his readers of this fact, and fails to commit himself directly on the
question of the validity and importance of this argument. He does come to
grips with it in somewhat oblique fashion in his citation and defense of the
contention made by fair trade advocates that the Miller-Tydings and McGuire
Acts protect the consumer against any undue restraints by sanctioning fair
trade pricing only where the goods in question are sold in "free and open
competition" with other goods of the same general class. Professor Adams
comments that "from the consumer's point of view this is a crucial safeguard
against exploitation. So long as there is effective competition between manu-
facturers, the fact that each of them sees fit to set minimum resale prices is of
secondary importance.
' 7
The adequacy of this reply to the "most telling argument against fair trade"
can be discussed in terms of the following questions: First, is it meaningful
and accurate to say that "so long as there is effective competition between
manufacturers" fair trade is not likely to prove injurious to consumers?
Second, have the courts interpreted the "free and open competition" proviso
in a manner that renders it readily available for the prevention of fair trade
pricing by firms possessing substantial monopoly power? Third, given the
nature and background of the fair trade laws, and the state of court interpreta-
tion of the "free and open competition" proviso, is it reasonable to expect
effective enforcement of this proviso by the antitrust agencies?
5. Id. at 970. Not only does competition among distributors tend to be reduced by
the contractual determination of dealer margins under fair trade, but distributors desiring
to engage in horizontal price fixing are able to do so without violating the law if one of
their number enters a vertical contract with a supplier and places the other dealers on
notice of the existence of the contract. Manufacturers are still formally free to compete
in factory price, but price competition among manufacturers is likely to be curbed with
the extension of fair trade because of the diminution of dealer pressure for price con-
cessions and the reduction of other unstabilizing (and competition promoting) effects of
price competition at the distributive level. Furthermore, fair trade provides a convenient
mechanism for facilitating manufacturer curbs on competition, since by establishing con-
tracts with single distributors, with retail prices and discounts equivalent to those of other
manufacturers, any manufacturer can obtain the effects of a horizontal price agreement.
C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 72 (1949); STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY
AND FREE ENTERPRISE 322-23 (1951); FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANcE
lxii (1945).
6. See, e.g., J. M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 381 (2d ed. 1939); C.
EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 66-73; MACHLUP, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY
214-15, 229 (1952) ; MuND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 474-75 (2d ed. 1955); OXEN-
FELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 422-29 (1951); PURDY, LINDAHL &
CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 439 (1950); STOCKING & WAT-
KINS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 322-24; WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 420-21
(1955).
7. Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967, 972 (1955).
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As regards the first question, it should be noted initially that fair traded
goods are invariably differentiated products (being branded and trademarked
commodities), and are frequently sold in markets of few sellers. This means
that such goods are sold under conditions in which significant factors are
already at work tending to reduce the effectiveness of competition. To say
that fair trade is harmless so long as there is effective competition among
manufacturers is to disregard and divert attention from the fact that fair trade
is itself a factor tending to reduce the effectiveness of competition in markets
in which competition is already limited.8 Even assuming effective competition
among manufacturers, however, there is no rational foundation for the asser-
tion that a sufficient degree of competition among manufacturers eliminates the
possibility that significant adverse effects may result from fair trade. Insofar
as fair trade is effective it tends to raise distribution costs by depriving low cost
distributors and the public of the advantages of superior efficiency, by divert-
ing competition into cost-increasing non-price channels, and, as a result of
high profit margins, by inducing excessive entry and capacity (and inefficient
output volume per unit) in the field of distribution. These higher distribution,
costs tend to be translated into higher prices to consumers irrespective of
the degree of manufacturer competition. 9
Court decisions interpreting the "free and open competition" proviso have
been sparse but nonetheless revealing. In the only decision thus far rendered
in which the "free and open competition" proviso of the federal fair trade
laws has been interpreted, it was held that "if a purchaser wants a color film
he must be able to buy it from more than one manufacturer if there is to be
free and open competition with commodities of the same general class .... 10
Courts have found the almost identical "fair and open competition" provisos
of several state laws insufficient to condemn fair trade pricing in the long
8. Professor Adams cites information supplied by the Bureau of Education on Fair
Trade indicating the existence of a substantial number of brands of six classes of com-
modities-sterling silverware, face powder, toilet soap, washing machines, floor wax and
dentifrices--from which he concludes that if such information is correct, then "the fact
that the resale price of each brand is set by the manufacturer is of relatively minor
significance." Id. at 972-73. However, not only is this evidence unverified and not shown
to be representative of fair traded goods in general, but in addition the conclusion
rests on the implicit and largely invalid assumptions (1) that all the cited brands are
typically sold in the same markets, (2) that each of these brands is produced by a differ-
ent firm, and (3) that the branding and advertising of these various products does not
convey substantial monopoly power. The fact that the consumer can choose between an
alleged 58 brands of sterling silverware and 76 brands of toilet soap should be considered
in the light of the fact that the four largest producers of these commodities accounted
for 61 and 79 per cent of the 1947 output of sterling silverware and soap respectively.
FTC, REPORT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANUFACTURING 142, 147 (1954).
9. See C. EDWARDS, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 69-71; GRETHR, PRICE CONTROL UNDER
FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 294-320 (1939); OXENFELDT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 429;
STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 330.
10. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 828 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
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playing phonograph industry (in which four firms produced seventy-nine per
cent of the 1947 output) ;11 in the automatic lighter business (in which the
court found that "Ronson had more than a majority of the lighter business in
the country in 1951") ;1'2 and in the whiskey industry (in which four firms
produced seventy-five per cent of the 19"47 output). 13 The standards thus
far developed in interpreting the protective proviso would appear to sanction
the use of fair trade contracts where there are several independent sellers of
a similar type of commodity, and where such sellers are not acting in a
manner that would ordinarily constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.1
A proviso so interpreted, and written into statutes the essence of which is re-
striction of competition, cannot be taken seriously as a "crucial safeguard
against exploitation."'15
Professor Adams expresses disappointment at the failure of the antitrust
agencies to enforce the proviso guaranteeing the consumer against exploitation,
but he does not consider whether nonenforcement has resulted from mere
obstinacy on the part of these agencies or from more deep-seated obstacles.
Among the latter, the Department of Justice has noted the vagueness of the
"free and open competition" proviso, 16 and attention has already been called
to the character of court interpretations of this proviso, which has hardly been
such as to infuse the antitrust agencies with a fervor for enforcement. Further-
more, the fair trade laws have increased the enforcement responsibilities of
the antitrust agencies by providing a mechanism "susceptible of use as a cloak
to hide general price fixing activities,"'17 although, as Professor Adams ob-
serves in another context, the resources of these agencies remain meager.' 8 As
Corwin Edwards has pointed out,
11. Columbia Records, Inc. v. Goody, 278 App. Div. 401, 105 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1st
Dep't 1951); FTC, REPoRT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANUFAcruUNG 146
(1954).
12. Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 1953 Trade Cas. ff 67562 (E.D.
Mo. May 25, 1953).
13. Carstairs Distiller Corp. v. H. C. Drescher Co., 106 N.Y.L.J. 110 col. 3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. July 1, 1941); Schenley Distributors, Inc. v. H. Hollander Co., CCH TRADE
REG. REP. ff 3154.23 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1940) ; FTC, REPORT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRA-
TION IN MANUFACTURING 138 (1954).
14. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 828 (1947) ; Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 1953 Trade Cas.
67562 (E.D. Mo. May 25, 1953) ; General Electric Co. v. S. Klein, Inc., 1953 Trade Cas.
1 67443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1953) ; Sunbeam Corp. v. Central Housekeeping Mart,
Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. ff 67379 (Ill. Super Ct. Dec. 9, 1952).
15. It is one of the remarkable features of Professor Adams' article that he indicates
awareness of the unencouraging manner in which the courts have interpreted the pro-
tective proviso in a footnote, Adams, supra note 7, at 969 n.6, and yet proceeds to con-
clusions that require that his own footnote be disregarded.
16. See the statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Committee on the Judiciary on Resale Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12,
at 42-43 (1952).
17. Id. at 43.
18. Adams, supra note 7, at 973.
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"in practice it is nearly always impossible for one manufacturer to
establish a system of vertical price fixing unless he can be sure that his
competitors will do likewise; and a single price-fixing commodity is
exposed to the inroads of competing commodities when these articles can
be sold for less than the fixed price. Consequently, horizontal collusion in
violation of the law has been an indispensable part of the movement for
resale price maintenance. . . . If the Antitrust Division had the men
and money to examine every resale price contract which has been written
under the cloak of State and Federal legislation . . . there would be
no resale price problem for there would be practically no resale price
contracts. In the absence of such wholesale law enforcement, the
system of resale price legislation has become a breeding ground for
restraints of trade such as Congress never intended to sanction and did
not sanction."' 9
The second argument against fair trade mentioned by Professor Adams is
"the prejudicial effect of fair trade on the consuming public."' 20 He notes that
a number of surveys have been "repeatedly cited" to demonstrate the adverse
effects of fair trade on the consumer, but he does not attempt a direct appraisal
of this body of evidence. Instead he again falls back on the allegations of
"fair trade advocates," who provide him with the following counter-argu-
ments. First, the usual surveys of the effects of fair trade on prices are alleged
to lack statistical significance because they are unrepresentative: "In the ab-
sence of fair trade, a department store or chain selling a diversified product
line can cut prices on nationally advertised, trade-marked articles to build up
store traffic, and hope to make up for its low margins or losses on these items
by the sale of other, less attractively priced goods. . . . [The challenged
surveys] do not show to what extent the 'bargains' purchased by some con-
sumers are subsidized by the 'lemons' purchased by other consumers."
'2 1
Secondly, the Bureau of Education on Fair Trade claims that studies made
for it by A. C. Nielsen & Co. "indicate that on the average the public paid less
for a list of leading drug and toilet articles in the fair trade areas than in the
non-fair trade areas of the country. '22 Finally, its supporters urge that insofar
as fair trade curbs loss-leader selling the consumer is protected against event-
ual monopolization of the channels of distribution.
23
It is quite true that statistical measurement of the effects of fair trade is
extremely difficult, and that the results thus far obtained are not entirely con-
clusive. Nevertheless, in virtually every instance of a survey carried out by
reasonably disinterested parties, the -spotty individual studies point to the
price increasing or stabilizing effects that we would expect on theoretical
19. Statement by Corwin Edwards, Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of
The House Comcnnittee on the Judiciary on Resale Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 12, at 440 (1952); see also the remarks of Assistant Attorney General Morison,
id. at 41.
20. Adams, supra note 7, at 971.
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grounds.2 4 Thus, although the aggregate evidence is not conclusive, it estab-
lishes a presumption that is not seriously disturbed by the counter-arguments
uncritically cited by Professor Adams. The argument that the unfavorable
surveys do not show the extent to which "bargain" prices are compensated for
by the sale of high priced "lemons," states a formal possibility which is not
supported by any evidence. The fact of bargain prices on a considerable range
of commodities cannot be dismissed by the mere assertion that bargains may
be offset by lemons. Such an assertion rests on an assumption of consumer
irrationality which is least appropriate for precisely those persons to whom
a unit of money has the most significance. Furthermore, no reason is given
for supposing that the exploitation of consumer irrationality is confined to the
large distributor. This assertion is also grounded on the assumption that
every store of a particular type has an almost identical over-all margin on sales,
so that sales of items at low margin must be offset by high margin sales. When
it is recognized that in many fields large volume distributors compensate for
systematically low margins by large sales volume, this assumption ceases to
be compelling.
25
When a group such as the Bureau of Education on Fair Trade releases a
set of conclusions that run counter to theoretical expectations and the results
of the bulk of other studies on the subject, it would hardly seem reasonable to
cite its results without question and then imply that the argument is a draw
because there are statistics on both sides. Professor Adams not only falls into
this error but, despite an alertness to the paradoxes in the arguments against
fair trade, he neglects calling attention to the dilemma raised by the Nielsen
study, namely that "loss leader selling" is apparently more prevalent in the
fair trade than in the non-fair trade states!
The contention that fair trade, by protecting the independent dealer against
loss leaders, protects the long run interest of the consumer in the maintenance
of competitive distribution, suffers from the fact that the consumer is asked
to undergo potentially severe current restraints on competition in distribution
24. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE pts. I, II (1945); GRETHER, op.
cit. supra note 9, passim; Hession, The Economics of Mandatory Fair Trade, 14 J.
MARKETING 707-20 (1950) ; Lewis, Economic Effects of Price Maintenance in Knoxville,
Tennessee, 4 J. MARKETING 139-46 (1939); Stewart, Mandatory Resale Price Mainte-
nanwe of Distilled Spirits in California, 18 J. MARKETING 370-79 (1954); Wolff & Holt-
hausen, The Control of Retail Prices Under the Fair Trade Laws, Dun's Review, July
1938, pp. 15-22, 44-47; The Not-So-Fair Trade Laws, Fortune, Jan. 1949i p. 70; Hearings
Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Resale
Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12, at 429-35 (1952) ; H.R. REP. No. 1516,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-45 (1952).
25. HOFFIMAN, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIEs, 3-4, 61-68
(TNEC Monograph No. 35, 1940); C. PHI.LIPS, MARKETING BY MANUFACTURERS
199-200 (2d ed. 1951); Gilchrist, The Discount House, 17 J. MARKETING 267, 270-71
(1953) ; Zimmerman, The Supermarket and the Changing Retail Structure, 5 J. MARKET-
ING 402, 405 (1941) ; FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1935).
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in order to prevent future developments that are highly uncertain.2 6 Not only
are other methods available for preventing monopolization of the distributive
mechanism which do not require the throwing out of the baby (current com-
petition in distribution) with the bath water (loss leaders) ,27 but serious ques-
tion can be raised concerning the efficacy of fair trade as a means for stabilizing
the market structure of the distributive trades.
This brings us to the third argument against fair trade: that it actually
contributes to the weakening of the competitive position of the independent
retailer by encouraging the development of private brands sold at prices sub-
stantially below those of the fair traded items to which the independent dealer
is largely confined. Professor Adams finds a curious paradox in this argument.
"Fair trade is condemned for destroying price competition and thus harming
the consumer. At the same time, it is attacked for stimulating price competi-
tion and weakening the independent retailer. Thus, fair trade opponents find
themselves contending that resale price maintenance is too effective, on the one
hand, and not effective enough, on the other."28 This paradox is unduly
strained. The emphasis on the words "destroying" and "stimulating" implies
that it may be difficult to conceive of the possibility that both might happen
to price competition as a result of fair trade. But the paradox falls to the
ground when we consider that the destruction may be now and the stimulus
occur only gradually over an extended period; and that the destruction may
be great and the stimulus relatively modest. A price fixing arrangement will
destroy competition and injure consumers now; in time, if the price fixers are
unable to prevent entry, defections from the conspiracy, or encroachments by
competitors outside of the arrangement, then there will be a tendency for out-
siders to expand business gradually at the expense of the combination by
quoting prices below the high levels fixed by that group. The competitive
position of the combination is worsened as the monopoly prices induce entry
and diminish the market shares of the price fixers. But the adverse competitive
effects are likely to be immediate and substantial; the induced increase in com-
petition is likely to lag and, at best, to return eventually only to approximately
the original degree of competition.
The fourth argument against fair trade is that it "inevitably produces a non-
competitive atmosphere which fosters violations of the antitrust laws."29 After
citing several cases in which the fair trade laws appear to have served as a
cloak for price fixing conspiracies and other restraints of trade, Professor
26. A necessary corollary of the argument that fair trade protects the consumer's
long rum interest in competitive distribution is that manufacturer competition is inade-
quate to provide such protection; and yet fair trade spokesmen typically justify the short
run restraints on competition in distribution that fair trade entails, by contending that
manufacturer competition sufficiently protects the consumer. This constitutes an admirable
effort to have one's cake and eat it too, but the tears for long run competitive distribution
are too obviously of the crocodile variety.
27. E.g., laws preventing sales below cost, predatory price cutting, and other abuses.
28. Adams, .supra note 7, at 971.
29. Ibid.
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Adams presents (with implicit approval) the reply of the advocates of fair
trade, who urge that "the very cases cited by opponents of fair trade demon-
strate that the antitrust laws can still be enforced where the practitioners of
fair trade exceed or abuse their carefully defined statutory rights." 30 However,
it would hardly appear to be an effective reply to a charge that certain legisla-
tion encourages the violation of other laws, to say that such violations are
themselves not exempt from the law!
In sum, the case against fair trade is not effectively challenged by the
counter-arguments cited by Professor Adams. The criticisms of fair trade
are adequate to sustain the conclusion that, from the standpoint of economic
effects, the fair trade laws run counter to the public interest.
THE ADEQUACY OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO FAIR TRADE
Professor Adams' policy recommendations rest not only on the alleged in-
conclusiveness of the case against fair trade, but also on the proposition that
resale price maintenance can be achieved without recourse to fair trade. If
other devices are readily available alternatives to fair trade as techniques
for the maintenance of resale prices, the repeal of the fair trade laws would
not effectively eliminate any evils inhering in resale price maintenance. Profes-
sor Adams assumes that this is the case, but he does not justify the assump-
tion. That there is at least an issue to be raised as to the substitutability
of the various price maintaining devices should be indicated by the magnitude
of the campaign waged on behalf of fair trade with these alleged alternatives
already in hand!
The resale price maintenance devices that may be considered as possible
alternatives to fair trade are forward integration,31 consignment selling, use
of the agency device, and the simple refusal to deal with those who fail
to maintain prices. Are these alternatives readily available and effective sub-
stitutes for fair trade as means of maintaining resale prices? Not only is
forward integration limited by the fact that it requires large additions to
capital investment and a considerable expansion of managerial responsibilities,
but it is also quite impractical for the typical producer of fair traded goods
who markets his product through thousands of "general" drug, hardware and
variety stores. Consignment selling likewise increases capital costs (by requir-
ing a larger inventory investment), and enhances the risks connected with
price change and obsolescence. It involves "not only the nuisance of making
reports but . . . also the frequent disagreement between the consignor's ac-
counts and the consignee's".;32 and "neither wholesalers nor retailers take the
same interest in a consigned product that they do in one they purchase out-
30. Id. at 972.
31. Professor Adams' article does not specifically examine the alternative of forward
integration.
32. Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance: II, 28 COLUmh. L REv. 441, 461
(1928).
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right. '33 The agency device also tends to increase the costs and risks of doing
business ;34 it restricts the number of distributive outlets that may be main-
tained ;3r and it can probably be utilized effectively for purposes of price main-
tenance only where the manufacturer has sufficient monopoly power to enable
him to induce virtually all desired dealers to enter such contracts.3 6 Refusing
to deal with those persistently cutting prices below the levels suggested by the
manufacturer does not enhance the costs and risks of doing business to the
extent of the previously mentioned devices, but it is a relatively clumsy and
ineffective substitute for fair trade. Refusal to deal provides neither the
strategic focal point for the co-operative efforts of organized dealers to pres-
sure manufacturers into price maintenance at satisfactory margins, nor the
convenient mechanism for manufacturer cooperation, that are afforded by the
enforceable fair trade contract (with the attached non-signer clause). There
are no legal penalties available as a supplement to refusals to deal to restrain
price cutters, so that manufacturer policing of retail prices and the flow of
goods through distributive channels must be persistent and comprehensive
for effective price maintenance. Some manufacturers are likely to be unable to
use this method, and others may feel that the kind of price maintenance
obtainable with this device is not worth the additional effort and expense
it entails.
In sum, there are disadvantages attaching to each of the alternative devices
for maintaining resale prices, which make them less than perfect substitutes
for fair trade. None of these devices possesses the combination of advantages
characteristic of fair trade: simplicity, low cost and risk, legal sanction, and
ready adaptability to the facilitation of horizontal collusion. The demise of
fair trade would not result in a simple shift from fair trade to some other
means of maintaining resale prices; in many instances the alternative methods
would be unavailable or simply not feasible.
CONCLUSIONS
If, as has been argued above, the case against fair trade is reasonably con-
vincing, and if for the typical fair-trading manufacturer the alternative price
maintaining devices are not readily available or effective substitutes for fair
trade, then, contrary to Professor Adans, the repeal of the Miller-Tydings
and McGuire Acts would be a sensible beginning in an effort to cope with
33. C. PHILLIPS, op. cit. supra note 25, at 328.
34. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 818-24 (D.N.J. 1949).
35. See C. PHLUPS, op. cit. supra note 25, at 186.
36. "First, in the typical fields to which the General Electric pattern is indigenous,
the problem of price maintenance is practically irrelevant. Second, in the fields where
price maintenance is desired, those manufacturers who are already least affected by com-
petition will be able to adopt the General Electric pattern with little difficulty, while those
to whom price maintenance would be most welcome are financially too weak to use that
pattern with success. Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance: 1, 28 COLumt. L. RFv.
312, 315 (1928).
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"the alleged vice of resale price maintenance." And if the "free and open
competition" provisos of the fair trade laws have shown themselves to be
hopelessly inadequate protection against abuses resulting directly from the
anti-competitive legislation to which they are attached, it would appear rather
pointless as well as highly impractical "to demand extension of the 'free and
open competition' proviso to other forms of resale price maintenance rather
than to urge the repeal of the only laws to which it is now an explicit part."
37
37. Adams, supra note 7, at 990.
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